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RICOEUR BETWEEN LEVINAS AND HEIDEGGER:
ANOTHER'S FURTHER ALTERITY
The possibility of extending philosophy at the heart of today's
postmodern conversation involves seemingly disparate
conversationalists. On the one hand, Leavens, whose later works have
been central to many postmodern deconstructive discussions, especially
those focused on ethics, proposes a radical alterity of the Other, death,
and time. This alterity, however, cannot be voided of the ethical
relation, as most deconstructive approaches attempt, without great loss
in the conversation. On the other hand, Heidegger's work, often used
today as a whipping post, and coming from the other direction, offers
an account of coexistence, death, and time which Levinas radically
opposes. We must confront this opposition to Heidegger in order to see
to what extent Heidegger's thinking is reducible, as Levinas contends,
to the same and to totality. In the context of this opposition, I consider
Ricoeur's thinking to be in a position between Levinas and Heidegger,
not merely as an eclectic one, but rather, one that follows his usual
fruitful fashion of going the distance with each thinker, exposing his
limits, and then appropriating each adjusted position in an
interarticulation that becomes his own unique and ingeniously inclusive
position, one which often gets too little attention among those who
consider themselves today's avant garde.
My thesis in this study is complex: first, that focusing on the
respective critiques of Heidegger by both Levinas and Ricoeur allows
us explicitly to see their differences; that seeing these, we can move to
relate them more clearly; and finally that we can come to understand, in
the light of pursuing these differences, a final position which consists
in somewhat adjusting Ricoeur's position enlightened by a rereading of
Levinas. Before this final position emerges, however, I will test the
contention of Kemp, I that Ricoeur is somewhat between Heidegger and
I See: Peter Kemp, "Ricoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas: Original Affinnation Between
Ontological Attestation and Ethical Injunction," in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 21, 1995.
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Levinas, taking into account Ricoeur's perhaps too severe critique of
Levinas.
Although Levinas continually affrrmed the extreme importance
of Heidegger's place in the philosophical tradition of the twentieth
century, his critique of Heidegger's work became more and more
explicit. Yet he openly admitted that Heidegger was one of the chief
influences on his thought, and, at once, one of his main antagonists.
This ongoing critique touches every main point of Levinas' developing
position. Perhaps his most far-reaching critique is doubly aimed at the
heart of the Heidegger's writings. Levinas considers Heidegger to have
failed to consider the transcendent Other; and to have failed to reach
the unique and singular solitude of the existent. In fact, in spite of
Heidegger's initial focus in Being and Time on the essence (Wesen) of
Dasein as existence, he fails to consider the existent, thus missing
his/her singularity and solitude. Rather, with his explication of
coexistence as the mit or the miteinander or the mitsein, Heidegger has
focused laterally within the Same. And in the other direction he has
failed to reach toward the transcendence of the Other in a personal face
to face relation, giving only a constitutive transcendence to the world as
ultimate. Levinas essentially focused on this precise point, for he
contends that transcendence to the Other is the ultimate constitution for
the existent in its solitude. And it is within this general double critique
that his manifold critiques of Heidegger can be seen. We must focus
more on this overall double critique, investigating frrst the solitude of
the singular existent, which itself comes to light in the context of
exteriority and alterity.
For Levinas alterity, rather than some Heideggerian shared
attribute such as coexistence as mitsein or miteinander, is the
constitutive key to social life. He obviously wants to separate himself
from Heidegger, but interestingly he does not want to make a clean
break. I am inclined to interpret even his extreme remarks in this
context to mean that he wants to extend beyond the coexistence or
mitsein to exteriority as the ultimate constitution of the Other, which
itself presupposes this coexistence, as indicated in the morality of
nourishment, as will be seen. For Levinas, we must do fulljustice to the
Other as alter ego. The Other, from a limited point of view, is indeed
alter ego as another myself or a coexistence or mitsein, but the Other is
still not me, and thus is Other. What Levinas wants to do is to uproot
the communion with the other as such as ultimately constitutive,
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showing that it is precisely only as transcendent that the Other is Other
and not me; just as I am solitary and not the other: "the other is in no
way another myself, participating with me in a common existence.,,2
Yet, in any consideration of Levinas in the context of Ricoeur's
critique, it is necessary to explicitly point out that Levinas fmds a place
for sympathy and pairing even though he rejects them as ultimately
constitutive of the intersubjective relationship,3 a point that Ricoeur
seems to miss. Levinas says: "The other is known through sympathy, as
another (my)self, as the alter ego....But already, in the very heart ofthe
relationship with the other that characterizes our social life, alterity
appears as a nonreciprocal relationship - that is, as contrasting strongly
with contemporaneousness. The Other as Other is not only an alter ego:
the Other is what I myself am not. The Other is this, not because of the
Other's character, or physiognorny, or psychology, but because of the
Other's very alterity.,,4 We see Levinas here developing the extreme
separation between the exteriority of the Other and the solitude of the
existent, which later becomes the focus throughout the whole of
Totality and Injinity.5 At this point we have seen explicitly the two
sides of the double critique of Heidegger, that of the solitude of the
existent and that of the Alterity of the separate Other. We have seen a
twofold separation emerge in Levinas' treatment of totality and infinity:
aseparation of the persona10ther from the intentional horizon of
human existence; and the separation of the existent in his/her singular
solitude from existence. In addition to what has been seen above,
Levinas' critique of Heidegger's early basic ontological difference is
also at the heart ofthe above double critique.
The fundamental critique of the ontological difference comes
to light when Levinas indicates that for Heidegger the distinction
between Being [Sein] and a being [Seiende or Seiendes] is a distinction
while for hirn it is aseparation. For Heidegger, the two are always
together, with existing always grasped in the existent and that existing
is "always possessed by someone. I do not think Heidegger can admit
2 Emmanuel Levinas, Time anti the Other, translated by Richard A. Cohen, (pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1987), p. 75.
3 Richard A. Cohen, footnote 63, p. 83 ofLevinas, Time and the Other.
4 Levinas, Time anti the Other, p. 83.
5 Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by Alphonso Lingis, (pittsburgh:
Duqesne University Press, 1969).
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an existing without existents, which to hirn would seem absurd. ,,6 And
closely tied with this difference regarding the interpretation of the
ontological difference is Levinas' attitude toward Heidegger's sense of
the disclosure constitutive of Dasein. For Levinas, it is precisely a
breaking out of the context of Heideggerian disclosure that the
exteriority of the Other and the separation of existents from their
existence requires. The ultimate significance of the event of the face to
face and of the work of justice does not lie in disclosure as Heidegger
contends, but rather lies beyond any intentional structure and are
constituted outside of representation and knowledge. "No prior
disclosure illuminates the production of these essentially nocturnal
events. The welcoming of the face and the work of justice - which
condition the birth of truth itself - are not interpretable in terms of
disclosure....The relation between the same and the other is not always
reducible to knowledge of the other by the same, nor even to the
revelation of the other to the same, which is already fundamentally
different from disclosure.,,7 And an extension of this critical stance
toward Heidegger is constituted by Levinas' basic ethics as one
involving ethical relation. For it is here that he accuses Heidegger of a
downfall that is unforgivable.
Heidegger has missed completely the sense of ethics,
especially in his very response to Jean Beaufret regarding an originary
ethics rooted in the truth ofbeing. For it is here that his ethics emerges
as impersonal and as an "ontology without morals," an "ontology of
the Neutral."s As indicated above in Levinas' critique of Heidegger,
Dasein is closed in on itself in the sense that it is not related to infinity
or the Other. It's deficiency or inauthenticity must consist in some
relation to itself: resulting in the diminuated and defective ethics
mentioned above. This is not a personal ethics, nor one that reaches the
Other, but rather a dimension of Dasein's relation to Being in the
emergence of the truth of Being for Dasein - at most an originary ethics
within that relation. And Peperzak so eloquently and precisely
expresses this: "The idea of a debt or guilt toward others than the self is
excluded from this thought. By the absence of a true alterity that could
question and accuse Dasein's freedom, that is, by the absence of an
6 Levinas, Time anti the Other, p. 45.
7 Levinas, Totality anti lnfinity, p. 27-28.
8 Stated by Philippe Nemo in Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics anti lnfinity: Conversations with Philippe
Nemo, translated by Richard A. Cohen (pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), p. 90.
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ethical 'principle,' the Heideggerian perspective belongs to a tradition
the barbarous depths of which were shown by Nazism. When
Heidegger criticizes the essence of technology, he forgets that the
source of modem evil, such as it was manifested in Nazism, is found at
a depth that lies deeper than the realm of technology. Alluding to
certain expressions found in Heidegger's later works, Levinas sketches
the portrait of a pagan existence rooted in mother earth and prone to
exploitation - very different from the sober existence ofavailability for
the needs of others. The individual are immersed in the physis that
encompasses them like elements of its unfolding. ,,9
Related to the above critique regarding the failure to get out of
subjectivity is Levinas' critique of Heidegger's view of time in relation
to exstasis, which does not break out of the subjectivity of Dasein.
Perhaps, I might add, the closest the later Heidegger comes to such a
breakout is the time of Being which is somewhat independent of
Dasein and is emitted in events. But this still misses essentially what
Levinas is indicating, even though it could be claimed that the time of
the other person aPRears somewhat on the horizon of worldly time,
ecstatic temporality. 0 It is here that one can see Levinas' critique ofthe
Heideggerian Being toward death, for Levinas considers death to be an
alterity related to time. For Heidegger, death is the possibili~ of no
longer having possibilities, or the impossibility of possibility. 1 What
strikes Levinas about Heidegger's account of death is that it shatters
"inauthentie possibilities,,12 rather then existence itself. Für Levinas,
rather, "Death in Heidegger is an event of freedom, whereas for me the
subject seems to reach the limit of the possible in suffering. It finds
itself enchained, overwhelmed, and in some way passive."13 For
Levinas, Heidegger does not go far enough regarding time. Levinas
considers time as radical alterity connected to the alterity of the Other.
But this alterity of time of the Other is not simultaneous with the time
9 Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy 0/Emmanuel Levinas (West
Lafayette, Indiana, Purdue University, 1993), p. 54.-55. For a very fine treatment ofthis element of
Heidegger, where he in his later work is seen to shuck off any trace of the ludeo-Christian tradition
in favor of the pagan Greek and Gennan traditions, as Peperzak states here so weIl, see lohn D.
Caputo, Demythologizing 0/Heidegger, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).
JO Richard A. Cohen, Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, p. 7.
II Levinas, Time and the Other, p. 70.
12 Cohen, Introduction to Time and the Other, p. 8.
13 Levinas, Time and the Other, pp. 70-71.
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of the subject, which is the time of knowledge and representation, so
that the other and the subject do not meet at the same time. As Cohen
puts it so weIl, the "time of the Other disrupts or interrupts my
temporality. It is this upset, this insertion ofthe Other's time into mine,
that establishes the alterity of veritable time, which is neither the
Other's time nor mine.,,14 It must be remembered that for Levinas death
is never a present,15 for if death is, then the subject is not, and if it is
not, then the subject iso In this way the tie among death, time, and the
other, aB as alterity, is traced. We see again in these themes Levinas'
critique of Heidegger carried further. For rather than death serving to
make a Dasein authentie or individuated or open to Being, Levinas sees
the other, death and time16 as radical alterity. Likewise with the
fundamental modes of being in relation to Dasein, especially the ready-
to hand, as we shall now see.
One of Levinas' constant themes leading to the heart of his
ethical relation is the reconsideration of our relation to an object, which
should not be redueed to Heidegger's ready-to-hand [zuhandenheit] . It
can be seen that enjoyment is a mode that cuts beneath the ready-to-
hand and that Heidegger overlooks this phenomenon entirely. Levinas
has stated: "This relationship with an object can be characterized by
enjoyment [jouissance]. All enjoyment is a way of being, but also a
sensation - that is, light and knowledge. It is absorption of the objeet,
but also distance with regard to it." Levinas goes on a few sentences
later to add an important insight presupposed by and prior in some
sense to the ethical relation. This point will have a signifieant role in
14Cohen, Introduction to Time and the Other, p. 12.
15 Regarding the "present" here, Cohen makes a good point in indicating that in both French and
English "the present" can mean both a gift or the present time.
16 There is another essential aspect of Levinas' thought here, but not necessary for the full
development of my own thesis. That is the role of the will, which as desire that is not the
satisfaction ofa need, and one which is not 10 be satisfied , carries 10 transcendence. Cohen focuses
on Levinas' passivity ofwill which emerges here. In the face 10 face, in the seeing the offense ofthe
offended, the good will is "elected to its moral status," so that the other counts more than myself
"The irreducible alterity of the Other, the time of the Other, impinges on the subject's temporal
syntheses from the outside, disrupting its unity with another time, the time of the Other or ethics,
the command which comes from on high. And in the same extraordinary moment, the Other's
command calls forth a subjectivity for-the-üther, that is to say, a subjectivity which fears murder
more than death,' which recognizes itself as murderous and the Other as vulnerable or destitute, the
object ofthe subject's actual or potential violence, tlie object ofirresponsibility and injustice." This
quote ofCohen is in: Time and the Other, p. 17: see pages 16 -17 for the sentence before this.
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Ricoeur's critique of Levinas' lack of reciprocity for the ethical relation.
He states that: "The morality of 'earthly nourishments' is the first
morality, the first abnegation. It is not the last, but one must pass
through it."17 And it is this notion of nourishment which is at the heart
of this critique ofHeidegger regarding enjoyment, for Levinas contends
that "prior to being a system of tools, the world is an ensemble of
nourishments. Human life in the world does not go beyond the objects
that fulfill it. ...These are the nourishments characteristic of our
existence in the world. It is an ecstatic existence - being outside oneself
- but limited by the object. ,,18 And it is precisely this relation with an
object that Levinas wants to characterize as enjoyment [jouissance] as
a way of being prior to the ready-to-hand. 1 will now turn to Ricoeur's
critiques of Heidegger's thought, which is not as extreme as that of
Levinas, in order to integrate the two critiques into a viable position
emerging from the fundamental insight of both Ricoeur and Levinas.
It can be seen that Ricoeur's fundamental critique of Heidegger
in Oneself as Another prerequires the earlier critiques made years
ago. 19 Although Ricoeur has been critical of Heidegger frorn the
beginning of his work decades ago, even before it was fashionable to
criticize hirn, he ernploys far more of Heidegger's analyses than
Levinas.20 The points ofhis critiques which interest me for our present
discussion are those complex and central remarks in the essay
"Existence and Henneneutics" and remarks in Fallible Man2] and Time
17 Emmanuel, Time and the Other, pp. 63-64. Cohen teils us in a footnote to this text of Levinas
also develops the notion ofenjoyment in Existence and Existents, pp. 37-45; Totality and Infinity,
pp. 127- 139, 143-151; and Otheerwise than Being, pp. 72-74. See also R. Cohen, "emmanuel
Levinas~ Happiness is Sensational Time," Philosophy Today, vol. 25, no. 3 (fall 1981), pp. 196-
203.
18 Levinas, Time and the Other, p. 63.
19 Paul Ricoeur, "Existence and Henneneutics," in Conflict 0/ Interpretation: Essays in
Hermeneutics, Edited by Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestem University Press, 1974).
20 I do not mean here to imply that Levinas has less respect for Heidegger than Ricoeur, for his
famous statements OOout Heidegger being one of the five great philosophers throughout the ages
cannot be forgonen, nor his contention that one must encounter in depth Heidegger's thought in
order to surpass it. Levinas" entire effort is tied to this surpassing of Heidegger's initial ontology
and later thought of Being, not that Heidegger is the only thinker with this profound an influence
on Levinas in his attempt to account for the transcendence to the Infinite Other. One need only to
remember his critiques ofHusserl, as weil as his espousal ofRosencranz.
21 Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, translated by Charles A. Kelbley (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1965), especially p. 67.
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and Narrative.22 It is against the backdrop of these critiques that
Oneselfas Another must be read to avoid interpreting Ricoeur's critique ·
of Heidegger as not going far enough.23 For it is there that we see his
critique center on Heidegger "short way" to ontology in contrast to
Ricoeur's own "long way;" and at the heart ofthis critique is the other
regarding Heidegger's premature projection of an ontological unity of
Dasein, which unity of the human Ricoeur insists is a limit concept,
something toward which we as human aim, and which cannot be
affinned as given to existence. And also equally relevant to this double
critique in the radical difference in their appropriations of Kant's role
ofReason. For Heidegger, Kant is approached as laying the foundation
of metaphysics, looked at from his own hermeneutical situatedness of
posing the Being question. In this endeavor, human Being is interpreted
as essentially fmite, so that human reason is brought down to earth and
sensibilized, with the imagination as the central place of origin,
following the interpretation of the romantics in the late eighteenth
century and early nineteenth century. Ricoeur ardently opposes this
rendition of reason, one which Cassirer calls an "iron-wood" or a
contradiction in terms.24 And in addition, we should look briefly at
Ricoeur's critique of Heidegger's treatment of time in order to find a
further place of affinity with Levinas. Before tuming to Ricoeur's
treatment of Heidegger in Oneself as· Another leading to his
appropriation of Levinas' basic insight, it will prove fruitful to cast this
later against the backdrop of a further understanding of these earlier
stances against Heidegger.
In his pivotal essay "Existence and Hermeneutics," Ricoeur
contrasts his own "longer way" for reaching ontology, taking
hermeneutic phenomenology as the proper vehicle, with Heidegger's
"shorter way" of re-asking the question of Being by assuming the
22 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago:
University ofChicago Press, 1988), Vol. ill.
23 Peter Kemp contends that while Ricoeur's critique of Levinas is too severe, which is at least in
part true, his critique of Heidegger is not severe enough. Kemp wants 10 tie this accusation to a
reading of Heidegger's notion of authenticity. As will be seen later, this is not so simply true. See:
Peter Kemp, "Ricoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas: Original Affirmation Between Ontological
Attestation and Ethicallnjunction," in Philosophyand Social Criticism, vol. 21, 195.
24 Ernst Cassirer, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," in Kant: Disputed Questions, edited
with an introduction and new translations by Moltke S. Gram (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1967),
pp. 131-158.
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intimacy between the inquirer and the Being of the inquirer. Ricoeur
does not want to jeopardize the advantage of his longer way, that it
dwells on the ontic level in order to resolve the conflicts and to solve
problems often overlooked in attempting to trace the most direct route
to the question of Being. Ricoeur's basic objections to Heidegger's
short way, as mentioned above, is that it too quickly reaches a unity of
Dasein which Ricoeur does not considers to be forthcoming, and which
remains for him problematical in that the unity of man is a regulative
idea and not one that an ontology ofDasein can reveal.25
Ricoeur emphasizes the conflict of interpretations as revealing
differing aspects of existence which ontically found various
hermeneutic methods?6 Further, on this ontic level and in an extended
ethics, he has focused pointedly upon the problem of the place of evil
in freedom within human existence and upon the ontic relation of
human existence to the Sacred which is central to his whole
philosophy. Thus, for Ricoeur, pausing to dweIl on the ontic has
fostered an integration or a dialectizing of the symbols which support a
phenomenology of spirit and a psychoanalysis of desire, with their
respective orientations to teleology and to archeology, both of which
prepare for the relation to the Sacred within a phenomenology of
religion and its eschatology. These advantages of the long way for
Ricoeur militate against Heidegger's short way.
The fundamental justification of the long way over the short
way to ontology is the underlying difference in the fore-comprehension
of human existence. For Ricoeur, as mentioned, the unity of man as a
regulative idea can not be achieved in existence and is not easily
accessible to an ontology worked out too quickly. He says: "moreover,
it is only in a conflict of rival hermeneutics that we perceive something
25 It can be admitted at this point that perhaps Ricoeur stresses too rnuch the broken aspect of
human being and the truncated dimension of human existence. His account, especially the later
ones, do ring true. Further Heidegger shows the advantage of passing 10 the originary level in an
ontology which provides a more comprehensive and foundational unity below the broken existence
which supports the contlict of henneneutics of existence which has preoccupied Ricoeur for so
long. Heidegger, however, as will be seen, has had to lop off the entire Kantian reason and the
infinite, as weil as the function of understanding in relation to such a reason driven to totality,
completeness and the unconditioned. Thus, although Heidegger is useful in helping to get Ricoeur
from fixating on his earlier interpretation of the existential role of evil, Ricoeur, even in his later
somewhat mitigated appropriationof Kant's view of the tendency to the good and the proclivity to
evil, can not ever go the distance with Heidegger's diminuated role ofKantian reason.
26 Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics," pp. 6-11.
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of the being to be interpreted: a unified ontology is as inaccessible to
our method as aseparate ontology. Rather, in every instance each
hermeneutics discovers the aspect of existence which founds it as
methode ,,27 Thus, at the very outset, Ricoeur has challenged Heidegger's
view of care in a fundamental ontology emerging from an existential
analysis of Dasein properly grasped in the fore-comprehension. In
addition, his view of the fallenness of human existence, in avoiding the
ontologization of fault by placing evil in the disproportionate synthesis
between the infmite and the finite, militates against the quick move
from the concrete existence of man to conditions of possibility of that
everyday existence.
Thus a great impasse is evinced in the differing passages from
existence to ontology by Ricoeur and by Heidegger. Heidegger does
not share Ricoeur's view of a broken existence as fallen, nor does he
dwell on the founding in ontic existence of the conflict of
interpretations and questions of method which arises from that conflict.
Although Ricoeur's position could be somewhat mitigated by softening
the effect of the existential place of evil, the difference can be breached
only by a radical adjustment in hermeneutics of existence, one closer to
the general context ofLevinas than to that ofHeidegger. In our present
context, this becomes another advantage of Ricoeur's approach, that it
allows somewhat of a rapport with Levinas' insistence on the
singularity and solitude ofthe existent, as will become more clear later.
Ricoeur's philosophy recasts the Kantian view of the demand
on the part of reason for totality as weH as reason's placing on
knowledge a limit to experience in terms of his own development of a
view ofthe quasi transcending ofthis limit through indirect expressions
such as symbols, metaphors and narrative. In addition, for Ricoeur,
such a demand for totality in a philosophy of limits requires that ethics
be extended beyond the Kantian formal ethic of law and freedom to an
ethics of the actualization of freedom in the act of existing. Such an
extended ethics reorients the place of radical evil in existence and
freedom, to the synthesis between the infinite and the finite as the
existential structural place for the possibility of evil, allowing for a
natural tendency to good but a mere proclivity toward evil. From that
view of evil in freedom and existence emerges the view of hope and
thus the necessity for speculative philosophy and its condition of
possibility from the innovation of meaning engendered by the
27 Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics," p. 19.
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/productive imagination in affording schemata for the mIes of
lunderstanding, and the extension of this function.
This broadened ethics, later to be seen as not incompatible
with Levinas' ethics, is understood as a philosophy that leads from
alienation to freedom and beatitude, attempting to grasp the "effort to
exist in its desire to be, ,,28 and opposing any reduction of reflection to a
simple critique or to a mere 'Justification of science and duty as a
reappropriation of our effort to exist; epistemology is only a part of this
broader task: we have to recover the act of existing, the positing of the
self, in all the density of its works. ,,29 Hence, it can be seen that Ricoeur
has corrected Kant's view of the place of evil in freedom. He has,
however, considered the locus of evil to stern from the disproportion in
the synthesis between finitude and infinitude on the theoretical,
practical, and especially affective levels which come to expression in
the fullness of symbolic language. It is from the symbols of evil that
thought reaches the notion of the servile will or the will in bondage.
We have seen, then, that the advantages of the "long way" militate
against the Heideggerian "short way. For, although his work on
hermeneutics of existence and on the conflict of interpretations seems
to flounder in dwelling on the ontic level before reaching the promised
land of ontology, the resolution ofthe conflict indicates the importance
of considering the ontic level further than Heidegger does.30
Thus, at the very outset, Ricoeur has challenged Heidegger's
view of the explicitly temporal unification of Dasein's Being as care.
Here, with the consideration of the conflicts in interpreting existence,
Ricoeur's two objections to Heidegger's short way converge. For
differing methods of interpretation are rooted in the different and
polemically synthesized dimensions of human existence which they
respectively reveal. Now, it can be seen that this earlier twofold
critique of Heidegger must be integrated with Ricoeur' s own later
critiques regarding the comprehension of Being and with Levinas'
critique regarding the need for the injunction of the face to face and
28 Paul Ricoeur, Freud anti Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, translated by Denis Savage
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 45.
29 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 45.
30 Ricoeur, The Conflict ojInterpretation, p. 19. He says: "Moreover, it is only in a conflict ofrival
henneneutics that we perceive something of the being to be interpreted: a unified ontology is as
inaccessible to our method as aseparate ontology. Rather, in every instance each henneneutics
discovers the aspect of existence which founds it as a method.~~
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Levinas' critiques of Heidegger seen above. With this in view, 1 will
now turn to Ricoeur's recent critique of Heidegger's view of time,
temporality and history.
Heidegger wants to ground every understanding of real
historical time on the comprehension of historicality in such a way that
the written history of historical sciences is derived from the
understanding of history. Ricoeur claims that Heidegger does not give
us any "way to show in what sense the real historical understandin§i
properly speaking, is derived from this original understanding,"
explicitly bringing into play here the critiques analyzed above. In that
Heidegger fails to show how historical sciences are dissociated from
natural sciences and how one can arbitrate conflicts between competing
interpretations, often inside even the same science. It is in this context
that Ricoeur accuses Heidegger of not resolving, but rather dissolving
problems of the conflicts of interpretation. Ricoeur, however, in his
later criticism, focuses again on a central point in Heidegger's whole
philosophy, that of tempörality, time and history. And, indeed, it is
Heidegger's failure to address the ontic sufficiently and the sciences
that prevents hirn from adequately dealing with the alterity of time or
the alterity of the Other, something to which Ricoeur can be seen to be
open without too much adjustment in his own position. For, in both
"Existence and Hermeneutics" and in Time and Narrative, Ricoeur
shows the need to pass through, on this level from which Heidegger's
reflection begins but too quickly escapes, indirect language of
narrative, earlier focusing on symbols and metaphors, now on narrative
history and fiction. Reflection becomes an interpretation of language to
decipher the meaning of my existence, even of myself, accessible in
depth only in such indirect approaches. This view of Ricoeur
culminates in the studies in Oneself as Another. And it is in this later
focus that narrative, or more precisely, the story, can constitute or
determine time in a way not envisioned by Kant or allowed for by
Heidegger or Levinas. This move represents Ricoeur's continual
expansion or completion of the work ofKant and Heidegger, here with
regard to the constitution of time, the productive imagination, and the
reflective judgment, all expanded into a coherent pieture of a
philosophy of action and ethical regeneration. In this context we can
31 Ricoeur, The Conj/ict 0/ Interpretation, p. 10. See: Peter Kemp, "Ricoeur Between Heidegger
and Levinas:" p. 47.
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see that historicalor human time, with its three connectors, the
calendar, the sequence of generations, and the trace, all constitute
historical time "through which we join not only our predecessors,
contemporaries and successors, but also the universe and cosmological
time.,,3 Thus, Ricoeur's criticism, which begins by reproaching
Heidegger for wanting to derive an understanding of history from an
understanding of Dasein's existence, ends in reproaching Heidegger for
an incapacity to think historical time itself. We must turn to Ricoeur's
fuller critique ofHeidegger's category oftemporality.
Ricoeur's strongest articulation of the critique of the
phenomenology of time comes to grips with the primordial time of
Heidegger. This critique of Heidegger's limitations regarding time is a
serious one which cannot be ignored, in spite of the fact that Ricoeur
extols the achievements of Being and Time, that is, that the principle of
temporalization is sought out within the structure of care which allows
for distinguishing time on different levels. Nevertheless, even with its
levels of temporalization, Heidegger's treatment of time reveals most
completelyan inability to incorporate a certain sense oftime. For, it is
from Kant that we learned that time as such is invisible, that it could
not appear in any living experience, that it is always presupposed as the
condition of experience, and from this fact could only appear indirectly
on objects apprehended in space and according to the schemata and the
categories of objectivity. According to Ricoeur, it is this constraint
which shows why even the internal time-consciousness borrows its
structure from this objective time that the reduction holds in suspense.
And even Heidegger's inclusion of the levels of temporalization fall
before this objection: "But this very effort comes up against the other
of phenomenological time: the 'popular' concept of time, made up of an
infinite series of indifferent nows. Even the most decentered level of
temporality - within-time-ness - where the 'in' of being in time is
highlighted, never rejoins the 'ordinary' time which is simply removed
from the phenomenological field by the alle~ation of an enigmatic
leveling of the 'in' of 'within-time-ness'." 3 Ricoeur considers
Heidegger's attempt to include the history of time from Aristotle to
Hegel in this ordinary time to be in vain. For Ricoeur, there is a
32 Peter Kemp, "Ricoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas:" p. 47.
33 Paul Ricoeur, ''Narrated Time," Philosophy Today, Vol. 29, No. 4/4, (Winter, 1985), p. 262. For
Ricoeur's lengthy treatment and critique of Heidegger on Temporality, see: Time and Narrative,
Vol. ill, pp. 60-96.
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disproportion between time that we unfold in living and time which
envelops us evel)'Where.
Heidegger's account does not take into consideration the
"heterogeneous temporal orders" to which the trace, as an original
phenomenon, belongs. Ricoeur asks the critical question of Heidegger's
attempt to deal with this in tenns of having been and within-time-ness:
"For how does Dasein interpret its having-been-there if not by relying
on the autonomy of marks left by the passage of former humans?
Heidegger's failure to understand the phenomenon of trace reflects the
failure of Sein and Zeit to give an account of the time of the world
which has no care for our care." 34 Ricoeur goes on to show how the
trace, as an element with history, crosses the gap between internal time
and cosmic time.
This critique paralleis the broader critique of Heidegger's
hermeneutic considered above. Although Ricoeur is exemplarily
respectful of Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology and primordial time
which it reveals, he must supply a hermeneutic which does more than
that of Heidegger. In allowing the text a certain distanciation from its
situation of origin, and focusing on it in a quasi independence of the
reader, Ricoeur has pointed out in henneneutics something similar to
what he is pointing out here regarding time, Le., the need adequately to
deal with that which is not reducible to the having been of Dasein in
the temporal ecstases. For, no matter how much effort is exerted to
consider the mode of being of Dasein, and the past as derivative from
the temporality or historicality of Dasein, the fact remains that there is
still something past which is independent of human existence and
Dasein's temporality and historicality - that other of which the trace
serves as a trace of - as, for example, with the historical documents,
monuments and implements which have no world remaining and no
Dasein which is familiar with them. This requires, in fact demands, a
reconstruction by imagination and intelligent interpretation and
explanation, before being appropriated into familiarity of human
existence. This is the same domain which is entered through a critique
of Heidegger regarding the inadequacy of the internal time of
phenomenology and his own primordial time that cannot encompass
cosmic time. This critique of Heidegger shows clearly how Heidegger's
perspective must be recognized in its limits regarding time and
34 Ricoeur, ''Narrated Time," p. 265.
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henneneutics, especially conceming that which is not reducible to care.
The primordial relation of Dasein to Being is inadequate to deal with
the othemess ofcosmic time and oftexts.
Further, for Heidegger, the drive for Being within his
henneneutical situatedness and the absolute status of the Being-
Question constitutive of Dasein lead Heidegger further into a pitfall
regarding history. In the Rule 0/ Metaphor Ricoeur turns against "the
manner in which Heidegger opposes all other ontologies by confining
them inside the bounds of'the' metaphysical.,,35 Continuing with Kemp,
we see that "This 'destruction of metaphysics' signifies in Ricoeur's
eyes an 'unacceptable claim... [to put] an end to the history ofbeing,' 36
a claim which is no more legitimate than the Hegelian attempt to
demonstrate the closing of history.37 Rather than support such a
destruction or, today, deconstruction, of metaphysics, Ricoeur asks:
"Which resources of ontology are capable of being reawakened,
liberated and regenerated by coming in touch with a phenomenology of
self?,,38 One can see in this criticism of Heidegger's destruction of the
history ofmetaphysics a latent critique of historical time.
Now that we have seen the fundamental critiques made by
both Levinas and Ricoeur ofHeidegger, we can now contrast them with
a view toward bringing their differing ethical orientations together, and
in the process, see if situating Ricoeur between Levinas and Heidegger
allows for a further development of his position in the light of that of
Levinas. We have seen that Levinas reveals a twofold separation
which Heidegger does not develop: the separation between communal
existence or coexistence (mitsein) and the singularity and solitude of
the existing existent; and the separation between the Other and Being-
in-the-world. Taking into account Ricoeur's critiques of Heidegger, we
can see first that Ricoeur's insistence on remaining on the ontic level
gives initial philosophical focus a basic affinity with that of Levinas,
for the ethical relation emphasized by Levinas takes place between to
35 See: Kemp, "Rieoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas," p. 48. The foeus of our diseussion here
is from the end ofthe Rule 0/Metaphor: Paul Ricoeur, The Rule 0/Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary
Studies 0/ the Creation 0/ Meaning in Language, tranlated by Robert Czemy with katldeen
MeLaughlin and John Costello, sj, (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1975), espeeially p. 311.
36 Kemp, "Rieoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas," p. 48: Rieoeur, The Rule 0/Metaphor, p.,
312.
37 Kemp, "Rieoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas," p. 48.
38 Kemp, "Rieoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas." P. 49.
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concretely existing singularities existing in some sense in separation
and external to one another. Although Ricoeur himself does not agree
with the intense separation, he does allow for a certain alterity which is
not so far removed from that of Levinas as to prevent an ethical relation
of Levinas' kind. It is precisely Ricoeur's alterity of time which allows
a further extension of his philosophy in the direction of Levinas, and,
picking up on a theme of the ethical freedom in the second person as
not too far from the face to face, we can develop his position in a
greater affmity for a positive contribution from Levinas, while leaving
his overall ethical framework and principle in tact. And it is this
general context of the ethical framework and principle, bringing an
adapted Aristotelian teleology and Kantian deontology together form a
coherent ethics that serves as a critique and an extension beyond
Levinas.
While Levinas has been seen to critique Heidegger's treatment
of time as not reaching time's alterity, especially in relation to death,
Ricoeur's critique centers around cosmic time as external to and other
than internal time, thus tying time to the cosmic rather than the Other as
Levinas does. They both, however, have recognized the insufficiency
of Heidegger's temporality of Dasein in relation to some other as the
faHure or break out of subjectivity or of Dasein. Now, time as other for
both Levinas and Ricoeur can be brought together, since the cosmic is
definitely other than temporality of Dasein, as seen earlier, and thus
overlaps with Levinas's view. The cosmic time of Ricoeur certainly
must be admitted in a full treatment, and just as the cosmic time
includes any singularity (me) independently of the time of Dasein, i.e.,
it is the time which preexists us and surrounds us, and into which we
are incorporated, it likewise is the time in which the Other is included,
and in which the Other participates. Just as my time shares in the
cosmic in so far as I am of the cosmic, so too for the other. Thus the
alterity overlaps in time, and the alterity of time of the other reveals
again the alterity of the other. Thus, Ricoeur's alterity of time of the
cosmic can be brought to Levinas' alterity of the Other. And this Other
is the place of the injunction or call to responsibility. We must reflect
further on the other separation which Levinas includes against
Heidegger, the separation between communal existence or coexistence
(mitsein) and singularity of the existent. We must see if there is a
connection with Ricoeur in spite of his critique of Levinas. The
question conceming Ricoeur is whether he really accounts for a
"singularity" or an overcoming of Heidegger on this point to the extent
that Levinas does so. Ricoeur does seem to include the singularity in
the face to face, but the question as posed leaves open the extent to
which he has explicitly incorporated it.
In the context ofRicoeur's own conviction of the priority of the
ethical over the moral, Levinas's language of summons and injunction
seems already too moral in a way similar to Kant in relation to
Aristotle: i.e., the ethical is the foundation of the moral, and the
injunction, duty and the law should not arise on the ethical horizon too
soon. Ricoeur delves below moral duty to fmd a latent "ethical sense"
which can be invoked in cases of "undecidable matters of
eonscience".39 It must be remembered that Ricoeur, in the Seventh and
Eighth Studies of Oneself as Another, polarizes Aristotelian ethics of
virtue and Kantian morality of obligation, showing all the while the
more fundamental dimension of the ethical aiming at or seeking of the
good life. It is clear, then, why solicitude of the ethical is presupposed
for the injunction: the critique of Kant in the Eighth Study could weIl
be applied to Levinas, that the injunction is invoked too soon, even
with the substitution of the face and the infinite for the Kantian pure
rational moral law. Thus, in this present context, it is clear why
Ricoeur shows that Levinas needs the ability to respond and the ability
for some kind of reeiprocity based on solicitude, whieh itself is caught
up in seeking the good life or human good. But one has to admit that, in
defense of Levinas, even Ricoeur has recognized the basie dimension
of the face to face for ethics. And earlier in Oneselfas Another, before
eonfronting the position of Levinas, Ricoeur has already laid bare the
nation of self-esteem latent within and intrinsie to the ethical aiming at
the good life, from which he now extracts, or within which he
interprets, a basic solicitude having the status of a "benevolent
spontaneity.,,40 Such benevolent spontaneity is the bases of a receiving
at the same level as being called to responsibility in acting in
accordance with justice, which is presupposed by any response of
responsibility. This reciprocity, or receiving and reaching, is not the
same as the equaJity of friendship, but it does compensate for the
dissymetry. Although the whole of the Aristotelian framework
eventually comes to light in reflection as the prerequired framework for
morality, it does not neeessarily get the first foeus within a
39 Paul Ricoeur, Oneseljas Another, translated by Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1992), p. 190.
40 Ricoeur, Oneseljas Another, p. /90.
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philosophical reflection. And even for Ricoeur, as has been seen, it is
freedom in the second person or the face of other in the personal
relation which begins ethics and takes on the connotation of
transcending the values of our culture and times.41 Further, it is
violence and evil which demand that the limit of the Aristotelian
framework is recognized.
Ricoeur contends that it is the search for equality across
inequality which establishes the place of solicitude in ethics. Solicitude
bespeaks a lack belonging to self-esteem, as the reflexive moment of
the wish for the good life, constituted with a lack evolving with a need,
a need for friends, and giving rise to the awareness of the self among
others. Thus it is seen that solicitude is not external to self-esteem, but
is constituted as a moment of self-esteem in its lack and need.
In taking Ricoeur to task for a too severe criticism of Levinas,
Kemp admits that Ricoeur's critique is not too severe if one agrees with
Ricoeur that "grounding ethics requires one to ascribe to solicitude a
more fundamental status than obedience to dUty.,,42 This is a critical
point, for it focuses precisely on Ricoeur's basic aim: to provide a quasi
Aristotelian ethical framework and an adjusted Kantian deontological
principle. The total backdrop and context for this critique of Levinas is
Ricoeurrs own efforts to critique and open up Kantian ethics of duty or
obligation to its proper grounding in an ethics or an ethos, coming from
the opposed direction. And in this Ricoeur's critique makes sense. But
both Ricoeur and Levinas disagree with Kant to the extent that they
each remove the priority to the absolute apriori moral law given to
pure practical reason; and each opens the way to the fundamental role
of desire, liberated from the Kantian interpretation. While Ricoeur
wants to ground the obligation to law in the ethics of teleology, and in
this context we could fix solicitude of our present context, Levinas
wants to bring obligation alive in the concrete situation of the face to
face, thus breaking out of totality, including even breaking out of the
framework that Ricoeur is so careful to provide. Ricoeur's criticism of
Kant can weIl be levied against Levinas in that he brings up the
injunction too soon, but Ricoeur now has to supply for Levinas what he
supplies for Kant, a foundation and a framework for ethics, which is
precisely what he has intended all along. Although in reflecting on the
41 Paul Ricoeur, "The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy," Philosophy Today, VoI.
28, 1978, pp. 178& 182-184.
42 Kemp, "Ricoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas," p. 55.
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moral situation one might first begin with the transcendence of the
"face to face," this beginning does not supply an adequate foundation
for ethical life, which has transpired at a basic level long before this
reflection catches it in the act, so to speak. And this is precisely where
Ricoeur incorporates a quasi Aristotelian teleological dimension into
the ethicomoral situation. And while Ricoeur might want to add this to
Levinas, and rightly so, it can be found that in the context of totality,
Levinas has already to some extent included the situation which makes
the "face to face" possible within totality.
Retaining Levinas' responsibility within Ricoeur's ethicomoral
integration allows Ricoeur's place of receptivity to be integrated with
an element of Levinas' view of totality, the latent exteriority. But this
must preclude any subordination ofLevinas's exteriority ofthe face and
infinity to the totality, which he so consistently and rigorously avoids,
and which would falsify or remove precisely the uniqueness of his view
of alterity. In accepting the role of solicitude in human existence,
Ricoeur has developed a place within interiority that really allows a
response to the face ofthe Other. And in doing so, he has accounted for
a central, indeed, the central point of Levinas, that a breakthrough--a
break out-- of the "totality" of traditional philosophy is necessary for
there to be a face to face encounter. This is precisely what Ricoeur has
done in interarticulating the two movements of Heidegger and
Levinas.43 And incorporating this alterity of the Other is not entirely
alien to Ricoeur's previous work, for he has encountered it in his
consideration of the alterity ofcosmic time, as seen above. So too here,
the exteriority of the Other is outside the domain of the Heideggerian
world, and of Levinas' totality. This is precisely the element ofLevinas
which must not be jeopardized in our present expansion of Levinas's
view in order to clarify how a relation is possible within interiority.
And, I dare say, Ricoeur seems to want to embrace this face to face in
indicating it as the place where ethics really begins. And it is precisely
in accepting the alterity of the Other that he has taken a positive
element in agreement with Levinas, a point which even deconstruction
likes. But this affinity with deconstruction cannot be exaggerated, for,
in this context of even a mitigated deconstruction, Levinas' account of
the ethical relation is lost to the deconstructive process, so that what
remains is only the obligation of deconstructing. And nothing of
43 It may be worth mentioning that the opposition Ricoeur draws is between Levinas and Husserl,
and it is within this context that Heidegger comes into the discussion.
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Ricoeur's undertaking as a project of ethicomoral philosophy, except
this same alterity which he shares with Levinas, can survive this
deconstructive process.
Hence, by bringing the opposing movements of Heidegger and
Levinas together, Ricoeur is ahle to adhere to a positive contribution of
postmodern deconstruction without succumbing to the allure of its
plunge into the abyss, forsaking the priority of the enterprise of reason.
Thus, by focusing on hoth Levinas' and Ricoeur's critiques of
Heidegger, we have heen ahle to fmd the common ground of alterity
between them, which, in spite of the distance which separates them,
allows an integration which supports Ricoeur's ethicomoral position.44
Loyola University
44 See footnote 28 above.
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